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ABSTRACT 
We analyze couples mode choice, with an application in Paris region. When spouses’ 
commuting decisions are assumed to be independent – the standard assumption – the model 
poorly reproduces intra-household decisions. We set up a model of joint decision, which 
provides more plausible results and exhibits a greater predictive power. We estimate the 
determinants of the bargaining power (spouses’ age, nationality, type of job contract, tenure 
status and number of children) using a collective model. To control remaining endogeneity 
issues, we finally model the joint choice of car ownership and mode choice. Values of time 
are computed for driving alone and together. 
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1. Introduction 
Mode choice, typically, involves the choice between public transport (transit) and private 
transport (car). It is an important component of short-run mobility and in the long term it is 
essential to explain urban development. Mode choice is also a crucial step in the standard 
four-step forecasting procedure (along with route choice, trip generation and trip distribution). 
It has been studied during almost half a century in Transportation (see De Donnea, 1971) and 
is associated to the development of discrete choice models (see Warner, 1962) and to entropy 
models (see Wilson, 1965). Mode choice or the study of mode split is also associated to Micro 
economics, Operations Research, marketing and psychology (see Bronner, 1982) inter alia. 
Mode choice decisions are important from a practical point of view since they represent a 
major component of accessibility, car usage and activity based models. In the short run, car 
ownership is fixed. In a longer run, mode choice interacts with car ownership, and with 
residential and professional location (Anas and Moses, 1979; Anas and Xu, 1999). Moreover, 
mode choice is necessary to compute the Value Of Time (denoted by VOT; see, e.g. Train and 
McFadden, 1978). VOT depends on the mode chosen (as will be verified in this paper), but 
also on the purpose of the trip. We show in this paper that mode choice decisions differ 
between men and women (and show how it depends on other individual characteristics). We 
also show how it depends on the bargaining process within the family. 
Interestingly, our empirical results show that the value of time depends on how the car is 
shared by men and women, one important aspect that has been neglected in the literature so 
far. We show that the VOT is not the same depending on whether the man or the woman 
drives the car (if both spouses commute in the same car). This paper considers an application 
in the Paris region (Ile-de-France) where car occupancy is still low, as in in many developed 
countries. For example, in the Paris region, it is 1.1 per car, for commuting trips. However, it 
is higher for non-commuting trip and up to 1.59 for leisure and visit (see DRIEA, 2013). Due 
to new modes of transportation, such as carpooling or car sharing, occupancy rate is likely to 
increase. Therefore it is important to be able to develop a methodology to compute the VOT 
when car is shared, as well as to better understand the determinants of such joint decision. We 
restrict our analysis to a specific and well defined situation: the family. We will study the 
usage of car in two-earner couples (married or not), which may, or not have to share the same 
car.  
This paper will provide a first step to better analyze car sharing, discounted rental cars in the 
new emerging transportation environment, which remain very poorly understood so far, even 
though large data sets (Big Data on individual behavior and mobility pattern) are accumulated 
by major companies (such as IBM, Orange or Siemens) or by new rapidly growing companies 
(such as BlaBlaCar or VroomVroomVroom, for example).  
In the standard framework, one individual is facing one, two or more modes for each specific 
trip and s/he selects the most attractive one. We wish to extend this framework, when the 
decisions of the two commuters (in the same couple) are interdependent, since they may use 
the same car. If spouses decide to use the same car, it remains to know who drives. We will 
determine how to compute the VOT (and the fixed cost) taken into account by each decision 
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maker when spouses commute together, and compare those values, with the standard ones, 
that can be derived when we make the wrong assumption that the commuting decisions of 
spouses are independent. 
When sharing a car is an option, it is necessary to provide a description of the bargaining 
process (or of the joint decision process) which takes place in the family. The couple may 
have more or less conflicting objectives, which take into account physical constraints (being 
on time at work, for example) and preferences (willingness to spend some time with the other 
spouse, for example). Clearly man and woman are able to different extent to influence the 
joint decision made by the couple. The interdependence of spouses’ mode choice decisions is 
described using a bargaining model. The respective importance of the man and the woman in 
the decision process is measured by their respective importance in the joint decision process. 
This respective importance of each spouse is measured by the Pareto weights. We estimate 
these Pareto weights simultaneously with spouses’ respective values of time, thus 
disentangling the roles of preferences and bargaining process in couple mode choice 
decisions. The Pareto weight depends on socioeconomics characteristics, as discussed along 
with our econometric estimations of the joint models.  
The understanding of joint couple decisions is central in the evaluation of public policies, as 
underlined by Vermeulen (2002b) in the context of labor supply. Taking into account the joint 
nature of couple decisions is especially important when one spouse’s decision induces 
externalities on the other spouse, which is the case both in labor supply (through joint 
taxation) and in mode choice (competition for using the car or differential value of time when 
commuting together or alone). In the departure time context (see de Palma et al., 2015), when 
a spouse leaves home, he/she imposes an externality on the other spouse. 
A number of policies, such as toll, parking fee, dedicated lane, zoning, etc. affect mode 
choice. The responses however depend on the way the car is used in the couple. The car can 
either stay in the garage, or be used by any member of the family (with a driving license). 
Responses to policies, and car usage, could not be understood without understanding the 
bargaining process within the family. Recently, de Palma et al. (2015) have shown that when 
couples commuting by car coordinate their departure time decision, this may lead (in 
aggregate) to more congestion on the roads. When studying the global impact of transport 
policies, it is important to know how each spouse reacts to policies, how they benefit 
individually or are impacted by such policies, and how micro decisions aggregate. The 
heterogeneity within the family is as important as the heterogeneity between families.  
In Section 2, we introduce briefly the bargaining models and collective models, used in the 
economics of the family. We also discuss the difference between individual and joint 
decisions. The data on Paris region are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we start with the 
simplest model by assuming that mode choices made by spouses are independent choices. We 
then discuss the results which suggest that the independence hypothesis (although standard in 
the literature) is not valid. In Section 5, we develop a more realistic model in which spouses 
jointly choose their mode by maximizing a weighted average utility of the man and the 
woman. In this section, we still assume exogenous car ownership. The weights are referred to 
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as Pareto weights and measure the spouses’ respective bargaining power. The problems 
discussed in Section 4 are less severe in Section 5, but still important. Estimations of Section 
5 suffer from potential biases due to the endogeneity of car ownership. Indeed, the 
endogeneity is due to the fact that the number of cars, which is a key determinant of mode 
choice, is chosen by the couple. To correct for these endogeneity biases, we estimate in 
Section 6 a joint mode and car ownership model and compare the results to those of the 
previous models. Our estimates suggest significant differences in VOT of spouses when they 
travel alone by car or together. The results are considerably improved with the estimate of 
mode choice. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Mode choice: Individual or joint decision? 
In the economic literature, family models considering a single decision maker are usually 
referred to as unitary models (see Becker, 1965, 1991). Many researchers, especially in family 
economics, criticize this assumption, questioning the hypothesis that the behavior of multi-
person households can be described by a single decision-maker model satisfying the basic 
preference axioms or the income pooling property: according to this hypothesis, no matter 
who earns income in the family, it is spent the same way. Such criticisms are recognized 
informally by some researchers in urban economics, but not yet formalized in the study of 
mode choice and car ownership (see Chiappori et al., 2014 and de Palma et al., 2014).  
Different research streams concerned with household decisions have been developed 
independently in transportation, time and task allocation, or residential location. However, 
most of these contributions are unitary models since households are treated as a single 
decision-making unit. As a consequence, the interactions within the household are not 
explicitly modeled and the outcomes of the decision-making process are considered as 
resulting from a representative individual as if the household were a black box which did not 
need be opened.  
Recently, researchers in the urban and transport context have started to study the family 
determinants of choices affecting the family (Abraham and Hunt, 1997; Bhat and Pendyala., 
2005; Timmermans, 2006; Timmermans, 2009; Beharry-Borg et al., 2009) even though they 
did not yet study the within-family bargaining process. In this literature, household 
interactions are either introduced through explanatory variables defined at the household 
level, or simply disregarded. Examples of household-level explanatory variables are number 
of household (active) members, number of children as well as household income, and other 
household dummy variables (e.g., household head occupational status, tenure status, age, 
etc.). 
By contrast, collective models (Chiappori, 1988, 1992) recognize that household decisions 
result from a bargaining process involving several decision-makers with individual-specific 
bargaining power. These non-unitary models developed in the economics of the family 
literature do not merely extend existing unitary model, and the discrete choice framework. 
They introduce new concepts specific to within family interactions: negotiation, altruism, 
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repeated interaction and Pareto optimality (See the survey Vermeulen, 2002a and Browning et 
al., 2014).  
When there is more than one decision-maker in the household, a complex bargaining process 
usually takes place. Since the 80's, economic literature has developed models analyzing the 
within-family bargaining process in other contexts such as labor supply or consumption (see 
Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). Chiappori (1988) developed the collective model, which 
explicitly recognizes that multi-person households face joint decisions involving partially 
altruistic members. In such models, decisions are assumed to be Pareto-optimal. When 
spouses jointly make decisions, the outcome is Pareto-optimal, if it is not possible to make 
one spouse better-off without making the other spouse worse-off. Pareto-optimality 
hypothesis seems natural for analyzing household decisions since family members, who 
interact over a long period, are probably able to find mechanisms leading to efficient 
decisions. Pareto-optimality can be tested empirically, and is usually not rejected. By contrast, 
the assumptions and/or conclusions of unitary models are usually rejected in multi-person 
households. 
The bargaining process, essential in collective models, can be either explicit (as in McElroy 
and Horney, 1981 or in Lundberg and Pollak, 1993), or non-specified (as in Chiappori, 1988, 
1992). In this paper, the use of a single car in the dual-earner couple will be the outcome of a 
Pareto-optimal bargaining process.  
As shown in Chiappori (1992) collective models can be used to study the welfare level of 
each household member, and therefore to analyze and measure in a consistent way the 
redistributive effects of any economic policy, not only at the household level but also at the 
individual level. More specifically, Chiappori (1992) showed that, under some rather 
plausible conditions, individual utility functions can be recovered from household behavior 
and disentangled from bargaining power effects, whereas bargaining effects induce a bias in 
the measurement of preference parameters in unitary models.  
In this paper, we introduce a collective model in urban and transport economics, to describe 
joint mode choice and car-ownership within the family. We focus on spouses’ mode choice 
for commuting trips (home to workplace). Our models allow us to estimate the value of time 
(up to a multiplicative constant). In this preliminary analysis, we assume fixed residential and 
work locations. We recognize explicitly that the decision to buy or to use a car are not 
individual-specific but joint decisions. First, the car is often a public good, which is shared by 
several members of the household. Second, the purchase cost and the variable costs of the car 
are fully or partially supported by the different family member. At the same time, if the house 
or the apartment has a garage, it has to be paid by the different members of the household, in a 
way or another.  
Since the late 1990s, transport economics has introduced the family dimension to analyze 
mode choice decisions. For example, Abraham and Hunt (1997) use a logit model structure 
with a system for weighting the contributions of different workers to the household utility in a 
three-level nested logit (residential location, workplace, and mode choice). However, these 
weights merge the individual preferences (spouses’ Values Of Time) and bargaining powers, 
 6 
 
or Pareto weights. As far as we know, the within family decision processes determining 
together mode choice and car ownership have not yet been investigated in the literature. 
However, these questions have been investigated for long time from the individual point of 
view. For example, according to Lerman (1977), household location decisions are closely 
related to other choices (disaggregate choice theory) such as automobile ownership, and mode 
to work. Even in a simplified static world, the joint purchasing decision is complex, since the 
underlying implications are often complex: Who uses the cars, who pays for gasoline, repairs, 
etc.? This paper proposes a first model of joint decision of car ownership and mode choice in 
the household. 
Mode choice is a major topic in transportation economics. Since the first paper using the 
binary Logit to study modal choice by Warner (1962), a large literature based on discrete 
choice models (see, e.g. McFadden and Train, 2000; Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985) has 
emerged. In this paper, we use the individual discrete approach as a starting point to analyze 
joint mode choice decisions. Using this approach, we explain rivalry between decision makers 
for using the single car in the household. We focus here our attention on a specific situation 
(commuting), where the use of a car is an alternative to the use of public transit. Selecting the 
car rather than public transit may result in different outcomes with respect to travel cost, 
travel time, travel distance or generalized cost (and risk). When there is a single car in a dual-
earner household, the use of a private car by the household members is necessarily a joint 
decision, rather than the outcome of independent choices. The final choice depends on the 
individual value of time, work schedule, some constraints (such as picking-up children) and 
the constraints that each spouse imposes on his/her partner, in a manner that remains unclear 
in the literature until now.  
The challenges in this research are (1) to understand the way these individual characteristics 
get combined (2) to understand the way joint decision are made, and (3) to study how this 
affects the value of time. We know that the value of time is not the same in public and in 
private transportation. We plan to go one step ahead, and show that the value of time is not 
the same according to the fact that man is driving or is a passenger (for the same trip, with the 
same person).  
3. Data 
Paris Region (Ile-de-France) is composed by 8 départements: Paris city (CBD and historical 
center), 3 départements (counties) around Paris (Inner ring), and 5 départements farther away 
(Outer ring). Paris city concentrates a majority of the jobs, has a very dense public 
transportation network and a very congested private transportation network. The majority of 
households live in the Outer ring. The 8 départements are subdivided in 1300 communes 
(including 20 arrondissements in Paris city). In the Outer ring, communes are very small 
(some of them include less than 100 inhabitants). 
Our study relies on data form the 1999 Census in Paris Region, which comprised more than 
10 million inhabitants in about 5 million households. This census data provides detailed 
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information about both residential location and workplace location in a 5% sample
4
, as well as 
standard socio-economic characteristic, car ownership and usual mode for commuting trips.  
 Number % with 0 cars % with 1 car % with at least  
2 cars 
Total 36,997 5.62 44.70 49.67 
Residence in Paris 4,766 22.39 59.44 18.17 
Residence in Inner ring 13,647 4.63 45.24 50.13 
Residence in Outer ring 18,584 2.06 40.52 57.41 
# children aged 0-3>0 7,090 5.06 49.53 45.40 
# children aged 4-6>0 6,219 4.92 46.29 48.79 
# children aged 7-11>0 8,866 4.06 42.22 53.72 
# children aged 12-16>0 7,929 3.73 41.19 55.08 
# children>0 20,795 4.36 44.70 50.94 
Man more educated than woman 6,683 5.52 45.14 49.33 
Woman more educated than man 8,872 4.40 44.95 50.65 
Tenure status=owner 21,147 1.92 36.10 61.97 
 F M F M F M F M 
Workplace in Paris 10,827 9,143 11.43 12.28 60.52 57.45 28.05 30.26 
Workplace in Inner Ring 12,501 13,585 4.46 4.59 41.62 42.94 53.92 52.47 
Workplace in Outer Ring 13,669 14,269 2.09 2.35 34.99 38.21 62.92 59.44 
Occup="blue collar" 2,250 8,542 11.11 7.74 50.98 50.57 37.91 41.69 
Occup=employee 15,563 4,510 6.59 10.16 49.98 54.70 43.44 35.14 
Occup="professional" 11,443 9,892 3.71 4.01 40.69 45.32 55.61 50.67 
Occup="white collar" 6,847 11,198 5.29 4.56 38.66 37.71 56.05 57.72 
Occup="self-employed" 894 2,855 2.35 1.93 34.68 36.60 62.98 61.47 
Foreign 3,271 3,732 16.81 16.21 52.40 50.19 30.79 33.60 
Age<35 13,155 10,528 8.45 8.71 52.21 53.25 39.34 38.04 
35<=Age<45 12,523 12,177 4.50 4.85 43.38 44.62 52.11 50.53 
45<=Age 11,319 14,292 3.59 4.02 37.43 38.48 58.98 57.51 
Table 1: Distribution of socioeconomic characteristics and car ownership for dual-earner couples 
Note: F stands for “Female” and M for “Male” 
Source: authors’ computation on 5% sample of the 1999 Census of the population in Paris region 
From the 5% sample of the population in Paris region, we have selected two-earner couples 
living and working in Paris region. We further restricted the sample to couples in which 
neither spouse is a farmer. We are left with 36,997 couples (56% of them have at least one 
child), corresponding to 73,994 individuals. We provide in Table 1 the distribution of the 
number of cars as a function of household and spouses characteristics, for dual-earner 
couples. 
The proportion of households owning 2 cars is lower and the proportion of households 
without a car higher in Paris compared with the suburbs (Inner and Outer rings). In particular, 
in the Outer Ring, where public transport infrastructures are less dense and where parking 
                                                 
4
 The job location is not available for the remaining 95% of the census sample. However, this 5% is selected so 
as to be representative of the whole sample. 
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places are easier to find, few households have no car, while those with 2 cars represent more 
than a half of the sample. Workplace location influences the car-ownership in a similar 
although less pronounced way: individuals working in the Inner or Outer Ring are more likely 
to own a car than those working inside Paris (see Figure 1). 
Only a minority of couples with children and homeowners have no car. Car-ownership 
increases with the age of the family members (both parents and children). Blue-collars and 
employees are more likely to own no car and less likely to own two cars than professionals, 
white-collars and self-employed workers. Foreigners are also less likely to own a car than 
French people. 
 
Figure 1: Car ownership by commune 
Source: authors’ calculation from 1999 Census 
Table 2 provides the distribution of the joint mode choices in our sample. A mode choice is 
denoted (j, j’), where j stands for the mode of the woman and j’ for the mode of the man. 
Modes can be either C or B, where C denotes the Car and B denotes the transit (Bus). 
Unsurprisingly, the number of cars owned by a couple increases the probability that both 
spouses commute by car while it decreases the probability that both commute by transit. 
When a household owns 1 car, the probability that the man drives while the woman commutes 
by transit is 2.4 times higher than the probability of the reversal. When it owns 2 cars, this 
ratio falls to 1.7. The distribution of the joint mode choice by residence and workplace is 
consistent with the distribution of the number of cars in Table 1. 
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We rely on the transport model MODUS (developed and calibrated by DRIEA, in charge of 
transportation studies in Paris region), which also contains 1300 zones. These zones are 
different from the communes: they are typically smaller inside Paris city and in the inner ring 
than in the outer ring. Each zone is represented by a “centroid” which can be a representative 
origin or destination in the corresponding zone. 
Selected mode joint (F, M) (C,B) (B,C) (B,B) (C,C) 
Total 10.41% 22.39% 20.44% 46.76% 
0-car - - 100%5 - 
1 car 14.60% 35.64% 27.94% 21.82% 
2 cars 7.82% 13.01% 4.67% 74.50% 
Residence in Paris CBD 7.49% 25.72% 52.01% 14.77% 
Residence in Inner ring 10.46% 24.44% 18.57% 46.54% 
Residence in Outer ring 11.13% 20.04% 13.71% 55.12% 
Workplace (F,M)     
   Paris, Paris 5.04% 19.74% 62.59% 12.63% 
   Paris, inner ring 3.08% 51.86% 32.37% 12.69% 
   Paris, outer ring 1.39% 67.46% 18.04% 13.11% 
   Inner ring, Paris 30.74% 11.56% 35.60% 22.10% 
   Inner ring, inner ring 8.06% 18.20% 12.80% 60.94% 
   Inner ring, outer ring 6.95% 26.72% 7.12% 59.21% 
   Outer ring, Paris 45.17% 6.87% 19.55% 28.42% 
   Outer ring, inner ring 18.08% 11.59% 7.11% 63.21% 
   Outer ring, outer ring 6.35% 11.33% 4.48% 77.84% 
Table 2: Distribution of joint mode choice 
Note: F stands for “Female”, M for “Male”, B for “transit (Bus)” and C for “Car”. (C, B) means the woman uses the car while 
the man uses transit. 
Source: authors’ computation on 5% sample of the 1999 Census of the population in Paris region 
The travel times were computed for each Origin-Destination pair for each mode using two 
different models. For public transportation, we use the generalized travel time as computed by 
the model MODUS. The generalized time is the sum of travel time on each sub-path (bus, 
tramway, metro, RER, train) of the public transport network and of the access, egress and 
transfer time. For private transportation, we rely on the output of the dynamic private 
transport model METROPOLIS that was calibrated on the basis of observed travel times and 
flows
6
. 
From this, we have computed commuting time of each spouse with each for the two 
transportation modes (car and transit). In addition, we also computed travel time between the 
two spouses’ workplaces, which is relevant in case one spouse drops the other one at her/his 
workplace before going to his/her own workplace. All these travel times are truncated using a 
lower bound of 1 minute and an upper bound of 240 minutes. The results are sum up in Table 
                                                 
5
 This proportion is equal to 100% because we excluded from the sample couples in which one spouse does not 
commute by transit or by car. 
6
 In METROPOLIS, the travel time depends on the time of the day. In the current analysis, we have no 
information about spouses’ departure times, so that we rely on an "expected" travel time computed as the log-
sum of the logit departure time choice model used. The departure time decisions within couples were explored 
by de Palma and Marchal (2002). 
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3. In most cases, women’s travel time to work is found to be lower than men’s, which is 
consistent with the fact that households tend to live closer to women’s workplace in Paris 
region (except in Paris, see Picard et al., 2013, Picard et al., 2015). 
Table 3 suggests that commuting mode choice is efficient in the sense that the fraction of 
individuals choosing public transport is larger when the ratio of commuting time by transit to 
commuting time by car is lower. For example, this ratio is 1.95 or 2.05 for women commuting 
by transit, whereas it is 2.63 or 2.93 for women commuting by car, depending on the mode 
chosen by their husbands. Similarly, this ratio is 1.78 or 1.98 for men commuting by transit, 
whereas it is 2.36 or 2.66 for men commuting by car, depending on the mode chosen by their 
wives. 
Selected mode (F,M) All (C,B) (B,C) (B,B) (C,C) 0 car 1 car 2 cars 
Woman’s travel time by transit (B) 49.08 45.58 48.79 42.78 52.76 36.13 45.80 53.51 
Woman’s travel time by car (C) 26.57 21.71 34.44 29.12 22.76 20.67 27.62 26.29 
Mean travel time ratio B/C, for F  2.50 2.63 1.95 2.05 2.93 2.32 2.28 2.71 
Man’s travel time by transit (B) 55.53 57.89 52.16 45.65 60.94 38.82 50.76 61.72 
Man’s travel time by car (C) 30.51 41.55 27.78 31.02 29.13 22.32 29.81 32.06 
Mean travel time ratio B/C, for M  2.36 1.78 2.36 1.98 2.66 2.28 2.23 2.50 
Travel time by car from man’s to woman’s job 26.39 30.02 34.00 19.98 24.73 20.11 25.76 27.66 
Travel time by car from woman’s to man’s job 26.38 39.68 27.04 19.67 26.04 19.68 24.77 28.59 
Extra time if man drives woman: 
% total direct commuting time 
47.36 40.39 59.22 40.35 46.30 50.21 47.37 47.03 
Extra time if woman drives man: 
% total direct commuting time 
59.01 80.05 52.87 47.63 62.24 56.94 56.05 61.91 
Table 3: Travel time distribution   (* in % of the direct travel time) 
Source: authors’ computations on 5% sample of the 1999 Census of the population in Paris region 
In the two bottom lines of Table 2, each extra-travel time corresponds to the commuting time 
of a spouse when s/he drives the other to her/his workplace before going to his/her work (that 
is, the commuting time to the other spouse’s workplace plus the time from this workplace to 
own work) minus the commuting time directly from home to own work. It is expressed in 
percentage of the sum of the spouses’ travel times if both of them commute directly to work 
by car. The extra-time if the man drives the woman to her job, is on average identical in 
couples with 1-car and 2-car couples while the extra-time when the woman drives the man is 
significantly higher in 2-car couples than in 1-car couples: this suggest that this extra-time of 
woman might be a determinant of the ownership of a second car.  
4. Independent model 
4.1. Individual choice sets and Binary Logit 
To explain the choice of spouses’ travel modes, different discrete choice models are estimated 
and compared in Sections 4 to 6. In this section, we make the standard assumption that the 
decisions of the two spouses are independent. In the next sections, we describe explicitly the 
joint mode choice decision and compare the two sets of results. The gender of the spouse is 
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denoted by G with  MFG , , where F denotes the woman (Female) while M denotes the man 
(Male). To simplify the analysis, we only consider heterosexual couples. Let j
iGU  be the 
indirect utility of spouse G in couple i using transport mode j=C, B, where C denotes the Car 
and B denotes the transit (Bus). 
We assume that the indirect utility function of spouse G in couple i using mode j is the sum of 
a deterministic (or measured utility) j
iGV  and an error term
j
iG : 
 j
iG
j
iG
j
iG VU  , j=C, B. (1) 
The error term measures taste heterogeneity. We postulate a linear utility function for the 
measured utility: 
 j
iG
j
iG
j
iG
j
iG ttV .  , j=C, B, (2) 
where j
iG  is the maximum utility of spouse G in couple i if s/he chooses mode j. The term 
j
iG  corresponds to the fixed benefit net of fixed cost of commuting by mode j. For each mode 
j, we only consider the direct route (the shortest travel time route) from home to work, which 
is characterized by an average total commuting time j
iGtt . The maximum utility 
j
iGV  is obtained 
when commuting time j
iGtt  is zero. The Value Of Time (VOT), denoted by
j
iG , is assumed to 
be independent of the commuting time. It corresponds to the opposite of the marginal utility 
of commuting time. We consider that working time is fixed and exogenously given, so that 
leisure time is reduced by 1 minute for each additional minute of commuting time. See de 
Palma et al. (2015), for a generalization in which the VOT depends on circumstances (i.e. on 
the activities performed by spouses at the origin and at the destination). As a consequence, the 
VOT includes the marginal utility of (foregone) leisure time, which depends on 
socioeconomic characteristics of spouse G in couple i (see Vickrey, 1969). In addition, the 
VOT includes an additional marginal weariness of commuting, which also depends on mode j. 
For example, public transports are rather congested in Paris and in RER trains, which 
translates in a higher value of time (DRIEA, 2013). 
In this section, we assume that each member of the couple independently chooses the mode j, 
which maximizes his/her indirect utility function BCjU jiG ,,  . This maximization is made 
regardless of the utility and of the choice made by the other spouse. It is further assumed that 
error terms are independent and identically distributed according to a Gumbel distribution 
G(0,1). Alternatively, it suffices to assume that the difference of error terms is logistically 
distributed. Standard computation (see, e.g. Anderson et al., 1992) shows that the probability 
of spouse G in couple i of selecting mode j is given by the binary Logit model as:  
 
 
   
BCj
VV
V
jP
B
iG
jC
iG
j
iG
iG ,,
expexp
exp


 . (3) 
The choice probability of each member of the couple is made according to the same analytical 
expression. De facto, decisions are independent. There is sufficiently observed heterogeneity 
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in our data to justify that additional unobserved heterogeneity, as introduced in a mixed logit, 
is not necessary. 
4.2. Estimation results for independent choices 
The model is estimated separately for men and women. For each gender, we compare the 
estimates for the households with one car, with two (or more) cars, and in the pooled sample 
(one or two or more cars; see column "All" in Table 1). Households with no car are not 
considered here since, in such households, the choice set of each spouse is reduced to a single 
alternative, B. Results are displayed in Table 4. 
In the subsample of households with one car, the subsample of households with two and in the 
pooled sample, the variance of the residuals is normalized to π²/3. In this case, the VOT j
iG  is 
defined up to a multiplicative constant, which is specific to each subsample. This implies that 
the values of the coefficients cannot be compared between the six columns, but the signs and 
significance levels of the coefficients can be compared across columns, as well as ratios of 
coefficients. The determinants of C
iG  are discussed in Section 4.2.1, whereas the determinants 
of j
iG  are discussed in Section 4.2.2.  
4.2.1. Fixed net benefit of commuting by car rather than by bus 
Without loss of generality, the constant term is normalized to zero: GiBiG  ,,0 . Therefore, 
we estimate a constant term (intercept) only for the car (drive) alternative, denoted “Intercept 
(drive)”. Our estimates show that the intercept C
iG  depends on workplace, occupation and 
nationality for both genders and on the number of children (by age group) for the women. 
Preliminary results (not reported here) show no effect of the number of children on the 
intercept C
iG  for the men.  
The reference individual is a 40 year-old French employee without children, working in Paris. 
For this reference individual, the intercept is negative for the women whatever the number of 
cars, which means that, if both commuting times were zero, the women would rather 
commute by bus than by car, especially when there is only 1 car in the household ( C
iF  is 
more negative in the 1-car sample than in the 2-cars sample or in the whole sample while the 
values of time jiF in each subsample are close). The intercept is positive (resp. negative) for 
the men in 2-cars (resp. 1-car) households. This means that, if both commuting times were 
zero, the reference man would rather commute by car in 2-cars households, but he would 
rather commute by bus in 1-car households. The coefficients of Workplace in Inner and Outer 
Ring in C
iG  are all (i.e. for both genders and whatever the number of cars) positive, and they 
are larger for the Outer Ring than for the Inner Ring. This means that, compared to the 
reference (workplace inside Paris), for a zero commuting time, the probability to commute by 
car is larger when the individual works in the inner ring, and even larger when s/he works in 
the outer ring. This is consistent with the fact that it is very difficult and costly to park inside 
Paris and, to a less extent in the inner ring.  
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 Pooled sample At least 2 cars Only 1 car 
  Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Fixed utility of commuting by car C
iG  
Intercept (drive) -1.839 
*** 
-0.772 
*** 
-0.340 
*** 
0.492 
*** 
-2.384 
*** 
-0.962 
*** 
  x (workplace in Inner Ring) 2.200 *** 1.662 *** 2.243 *** 1.649 *** 1.958 *** 1.485 *** 
  x (workplace in Outer Ring) 2.871 *** 2.270 *** 2.923 *** 2.347 *** 2.573 *** 1.984 *** 
  x (occup="blue collar") -0.040  0.397 *** -0.306 * 0.283 ** 0.166  0.374 *** 
  x (occup=employee) -  -  -  -  -  -  
  x (occup="professional") 0.509 *** 0.377 *** 0.421 *** 0.208  0.341 *** 0.278 *** 
  x (occup="white collar") 0.467 *** 0.146 ** 0.345 *** 0.133  0.194 ** -0.339 *** 
  x (occup="self-employed") 2.195 *** 2.090 *** 1.948 *** 1.887 *** 1.916 *** 1.770 *** 
  x Foreign -0.822 *** -0.403 *** -1.057 *** -0.545 *** -0.553 *** -0.212 *** 
  x # children aged 0-3 0.086 *** n.s  0.115 * n.s  0.124 *** n.s  
  x # children aged 4-6 0.131 *** n.s  0.210 *** n.s  0.092 ** n.s  
  x # children aged 7-11 0.189 *** n.s  0.103 ** n.s  0.151 *** n.s  
  x # children aged 12-16 0.199 *** n.s  0.215 *** n.s  0.136 *** n.s  
Value of time, by mode j
iG
 
By transit, ref. 1.492 
*** 
1.186 
*** 
1.421 
*** 
1.634 
*** 
1.233 
*** 
0.749 
*** 
By car, ref. 2.446 
*** 
1.831 
*** 
3.006 
*** 
2.734 
*** 
2.147 
*** 
1.505 
*** 
Ratio VOT Car/Transit, Ref.  1.639 
 
1.543 
 
2.116 
 
1.673 
 
1.741 
 
2.009 
 
  x (age-40)/10 0.223 *** 0.007  -0.276 *** -0.422 *** 0.057  -0.060  
  x (occup="blue collar") -0.599 *** -0.387 ** -0.460  -0.851 *** -0.603 *** -0.075  
  x (occup=employee) -  -  -  -  -  -  
  x (occup="professional") 0.149  -0.152  0.184  -0.361  0.130  -0.002  
  x (occup="white collar") 0.549 
*** 
0.859 
*** 
0.760 
*** 
0.385  0.264  1.238 
*** 
  x (occup="self-employed") -1.096 *** -0.468  -1.300 *** -0.622  -0.139  -0.047  
# observations 34915  34915  18377  18377  16538  16538  
Log-likelihood -16315  -15822  -5595  -5242  -8279  -9192  
Pseudo-R² (by gender) 32.6%   34.6%   56.1%   58.9%   27.8%   19.8%   
Pseudo-R² (F-M average) 33.6% 57.5% 23.8% 
Table 4: Estimation results for the Independent Binary Logit Mode choice 
Significant at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level 
Compared to the reference (employee) and for a zero commuting time, the probability to 
commute by car is larger for a man when he works as a blue collar. This may reflect the fact 
that factories are typically located in low density areas, which are less accessible than offices 
by public transportation. The difference between blue collars and employees is not significant 
for women (significant at the 10% level in the 2-car sample), but this may mainly result from 
the small number of blue collar women. Compared to the reference (employee), for a zero 
commuting time, the probability to commute by car is larger when the individual is 
professional, white-collar or self-employed, for both genders, except for white collar men in 
1-car households. This exception can hardly be explained. The other effects may reflect the 
fact that, compared to employees, such jobs require more flexibility with respect to schedules 
and the car offers the possibility to travel somewhere else than the workplace.  
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The coefficients of the Foreign dummy in C
iG  are all negative (both for men and women, and 
whatever the number of cars). This means that foreigners have a lower probability to 
commute by car than French commuters. This may reflect the fact that Foreigners (usually 
poorer than French commuters, even after controlling for occupation) are more sensitive than 
French commuters to the financial constraints which restrain the use of a car.  
For the women, the fixed benefit of commuting by car increases with the number of children 
(by age group) in the couple. This result is consistent with the fact that, in Paris region, it is 
more common for the mother than for the father to drop the children to school or to other 
activities on the way to workplace. In the pooled sample, older children increase the benefit of 
commuting by car more than younger children. However, in the subsamples (1 or 2+ cars), the 
differences by children’s age are not significant, and their order is sometimes (but not 
significantly) reversed. 
4.2.2. Value of Time by mode and mode choice 
The estimated value of time j
iG  depends on gender, mode and individual characteristics (age 
and occupation). The specification used here also imposes that, for a given gender, the 
difference of VOT between the two modes (proportional to C
iG -
B
iG ) does not depend on 
individual characteristics or, equivalently, that the effect of individual characteristics on VOT 
is the same by car and by bus, i.e. that C
iG -
C
Gi =
B
iG -
B
Gi '  for any individuals i and i’. 
For measuring the VOT, the reference individual is a 40-year old employee. Preliminary 
results, not reported here, showed no effect of nationality or number of children on the VOT.  
The VOT is significantly larger (about twice for of the reference individual) for private 
transportation than for public transportation. Age has an ambiguous effect on the VOT: 
positive for both genders in the pooled sample (significant only for men), negative for both 
genders, as expected, in the 2-car sample, not significant for either gender in the 1-car sample. 
The VOT is larger for white collars and lower for blue-collars and self-employed, than in the 
employee reference category. The VOT in the professional category is never (i.e. whatever 
gender and number of cars) significantly different from the VOT of employees. Overall, 
several results appear surprising, as discussed in Section 4.3.  
To translate the estimated coefficients j
iG  into VOT expressed in euros per hour, we use the 
the 12.6 €/h official value in Paris area recommended by Quinet (2014). If we assume that the 
VOT of the reference individual commuting by car is 12.6 €/h, then all coefficients should be 
multiplied by 12.6/2.446=5.15 for women in the pooled sample. As a result, according to the pooled 
sample estimates, the VOT of a white collar woman commuting by car would be 
12.6*(2.446+0.549)/2.446=15.43 €/h, whereas the VOT of a blue collar woman commuting by car 
would be 12.6*(2.446-0.599)/2.446=9.51 €/h. 
To help interpreting the values of the coefficients, we represent in Figure 2 the probability of 
commuting by car as a function of the common commuting time (assumed identical by transit 
and by car in this illustrative interpretation), for an individual in the reference category both 
for the fixed part and for the marginal part of the utility (French, 40-year old, employee, 
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without children, working in Paris). Three samples are displayed for each gender: 1 car, 2 or 
more cars and pooled sample. Since the VOT by car is larger than the VOT by transit (and 
constant), all probabilities decrease with commuting time. In each of the 3 samples, the 
probability of using the car is larger for the man than for the woman. When a couple acquires 
a second car, the probability to commute by car rises for each spouse and more substantially 
for the woman than for the man. For example, when the commuting time tends to zero, this 
probability to commute by car is more than 4 times larger with 2 cars than with 1 car for the 
woman, whereas it is only multiplied by 2 for the man. This confirms the result of Moses and 
Williamson (1963) that the man has priority to use the first car, whereas the second car is 
mainly for the woman. 
 
Figure 2: Probability to commute by car, as a function of common commuting time. Independent choices model. 
4.3. Criticism and suggested solution 
Some counter-intuitive results displayed in Table 4 are discussed below. 
The ratio of the VOT by mode (car/bus) is larger for women than for men when there are at 
least 2 cars in the household (2.116 >1.673), but the same ratio is smaller for women than for 
men in the households with only 1 car (1.741<2.009). In addition, the fixed utilities strongly 
depend on the number of cars, which is implicitly assumed to be exogenous in this section. 
Consistently with all these results, the probability to commute by car strongly increases with 
the number of cars in the households (see Figure 2), as expected.  
Imposing that preferences do not depend on the number of cars (pooled sample) reduces the 
log-likelihood by 16,315-(5,595+8,279) =2,241 for women and by 15,822-(5,252+9,192) 
=1,378 for men, that is a total of 2,241+1,378=3,819 for the couple. Such huge differences 
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cannot be explained by a change in preferences when a second car is bought. It seems more 
plausible that these differences mainly reflect constraints (both spouses cannot commute by 
car when there is only one car), as discussed in Section 5. An additional explanation, related 
to the endogeneity of car ownership, is also produced in Section 6. 
The explanatory power of the model, as measured by the pseudo-R² (Mc Fadden’s Likelihood 
Ratio Index) is fair in the 2-car sample, but very low in the 1-car sample, especially for the 
men (less than 20%). This is partly because the choice set is not well specified for one of the 
spouses when there is only one car since they cannot use it both if they do not go in the same 
direction. Once again, this suggests that the decisions of the two spouses are interrelated and 
should be treated as a joint choice within the same model. 
In the next Section, we explore the relevance of this explanation. To do this, we expand the 
model by considering that spouses’ mode choice decisions are interdependent. For this 
purpose, we need to generalize the standard logit individual choice model to joint decisions. 
5. Joint Multinomial Logit 
5.1. A MNL model with different choice sets 
We consider here the joint decision of the two members of a couple and assume that they 
maximize the weighted utility of spouses. These weights represent the respective importance 
of the decision makers (each spouse). 
We consider the two cases below: (1) there is a single car in the household and (2) there are 
two or more cars in the household (when there is no car, the mode choice solution is 
straightforward: both spouses are constrained to commute by public transport). 
If there is one car in the household, the five different options are: (B,B) if both spouses 
commute by bus), (C
A
,B) if the woman drives alone while the man commutes by bus, (B,C
A
) 
if the man drives alone while the woman commutes by bus, (C
D
,C
P
) if both spouses commute 
by car and the woman drives and (C
P
,C
D
) if both spouses commute by car and the man drives.  
If there are two or more cars in the household, the different choices are the same as above, 
plus a sixth additional option: (C
A
, C
A
), which corresponds to the case where both spouses 
drive alone. Note that since here we consider joint decisions, the alternative "car" is now split 
in three alternatives: C
A
, C
D 
and C
P
. 
Depending on the number of cars, the couple choice set, Ω, is equal to: 
          1 , , , , , , , , ,A A D P P DB B C B B C C C C C   for a 1-car household 
            2 , , , , , , , , , , ,A A D P P D A AB B C B B C C C C C C C   for a 2-car household. 
Contrarily to the standard individual mode choice model, alternatives here encapsulate the 
choice of the man and the woman. Whatever the number of cars, spouses decisions are still 
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independent in the (B, B) case, but dependent in the cases of, (C
D
,C
P
) and (C
P
,C
D
). When 
there is one car, the alternatives (C
A
, B), (B, C
A
) also involve dependent decisions. 
The indirect utility function associated to alternative   jj,  is given by: 
 , ' , ' , ' , ( , ) .j j j j j ji i iU V j j    . (4) 
The random terms ', jj
i are associated to the couple joint choice ),( jj  . We postulate that the 
deterministic utility of the couple is a weighted sum of the deterministic utility of the spouses:  
 , ' . (1 ). ,( , ) 0 1j jj ji i i iiF iMV V V j j  
      , . (5) 
The weight i of the woman’s utility represents her Pareto weight (and )1( i is the Pareto 
weight of the man), as discussed below in Section 5.2.
 
They may or may not be assumed to 
vary across households. Consistently with Section 2, the unitary model corresponds to the 
case where Pareto weights are constant and exogenous, whereas the collective model 
corresponds to the case where Pareto weights vary endogenously across households.  
The deterministic individual utilities j
iFV  and
j
iMV
  are specified in Equation (2). The constant 
terms j
iF and 
j
iM , as well as the VOT 
j
iF and 
j
iM  are now specific to the 4 cases: B, C
A
, C
D
, 
and C
P
. By contrast, the travel time is the same when one spouse drives the car alone and 
when s/he is driven to his/her work place by the other spouse, so we have the logical relation: 
C
iG
C
iG
C
iG tttttt
PA
 , where C
iGtt  was defined in Section 4. When a driver G drops his/her spouse 
G’, s/he incurs first the travel time from home to the workplace of his/her spouse G’: C
Gitt   
(while they are together in the car), and then the travel time from the workplace of G’ to 
his/her own workplace: C
GiGtt '  (alone). This represents a detour compared to the direct trip of 
the driver from home to work, since the triangular inequality implies that
C
iG
C
GiG
C
Gi tttttt  ' .  
In order to obtain expressions valid for all modes, we define the travel time 
DC
iGtt  of 
commuting with mode C
D
 as follows: 
 . . . , ', , ' , .
D D D AC C C C C C
iG iG iG iG iG iG Gtt tt tt G G G G M F        (6) 
With this definition, the deterministic individual utilities are, for all the modes j, given by: 
 . , , , , , , .j j j j A D PiG iG iG iGV tt j B C C C G M F      (7) 
Note that when the spouses share the same car, part of the trip is "together" and the driver 
incurs an additional travel time "alone". In the other cases, spouses only incur a travel time 
"alone". In both cases, the couple utility is of the form: 
 ,, ' , ,, , ,. . (1 ). . . , ( , )
j j j j j jj j j j j j
i i i i iiF iMiF alone iM alone iFM togetherV tt tt tt j j     
          , (8) 
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where the couple’s fixed benefit of commuting by joint mode ),( jj  and where the VOT 
of travelling together : 
  , . 1 .j jj ji i iiF iM    

   and  , . 1 .j jj ji i iiF iM    

   , ( , )j j   (9) 
are defined in Table 5 below.   
Individual-specific Identifiability Couple-specific 
Female Male    
B
iF  
B
iM  Normalized 
BB
i
,    BiMi
B
iFi  .1.   
B
iF  
B
iM  Identified separately 
B
iF ;
B
iF  
AC
iF  
B
iM  Identified separately BCi
A ,    BiMi
C
iFi
A
 .1.   
B
iF  
AC
iM  
Identified separately ACB
i
,   
AC
iMi
B
iFi  .1.   
AC
iF  
AC
iM  
Identified separately AC
iF  ; 
AC
iF  
  Constrained AA CC
i
,   
AA C
iMi
C
iFi  .1.   
PC
iF  
DC
iM  
Hardly identified separately PD CC
i
,   
PD C
iMi
C
iFi  .1.   
DC
iF  
PC
iM  
Hardly identified separately DP CC
i
,   
DP C
iMi
C
iFi  .1.   
PC
iF  
DC
iM  
Hardly identified separately PD CC
i
,   
PD C
iMi
C
iFi  .1.   
DC
iF  
PC
iM  
Hardly identified separately DP CC
i
,   
DP C
iMi
C
iFi  .1.   
Table 5 : Definition and identification of (α, β) parameters 
In Equation (8), the travel time  , ,k C BiG alone iG iGtt tt tt  corresponds to the time spent alone and 
      , , , , ( , ) , , ,  j j C C D P P DiF iMiFM togethertt tt tt j j C C C C    corresponds to the time spent together in the 
same car from household to the workplace of the spouse passenger.  
Assuming that the error terms are i.i.d. standard Gumbel, the choice probabilities are given by 
the Multinomial Logit formula: 
 
 
 
, '
, '
( , ')
exp
( , ') , ( , ) .
exp
j j
i
i k k
i
k k
V
P j j j j
V

 

 (10) 
The intercept of the utility of travelling together (that is the average of the man’s and the 
woman’s fixed utilities) can hardly be split into the gender-specific intercepts. Similarly, the 
coefficient of the commuting time together (
PC
iF , 
DC
iM , 
DC
iF  and 
PC
iM ) can hardly be 
estimated separately for the man and the woman of each couple since this common 
commuting time is the same for both spouse. 
5.2. Estimation results with equal Pareto weight (or unitary model) 
Table 6 presents the estimations of the joint models in the unitary case, when spouses’ 
weights are assumed exogenous and constant across households (and normalized to 0.5 for 
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each spouse). As previously, we compare the estimates for the households with one car, with 
two (or more) cars, and in the pooled sample (one or two or more cars).  
The sign and significance of the coefficients are rather unchanged compared to the 
independent model (Table 4). A notable exception concerns the fixed utility of the reference 
man in 2-car households when driving alone: it has the same negative sign (although 
insignificant for man in 2-car households) whatever the number of cars, unlike in the 
independent model. 
As in Section 4, households with no car are excluded from the estimation sample since, in 
such households, the choice set of each spouse is reduced to a single alternative. Compared to 
the estimations of the independent binary model (see Table 4), the joint model exhibits more 
realistic results for the parameters already estimated and reported in Table 4, and discussed in 
Section 4.3, even when Pareto weights are assumed constant (Table 6), as explained below.  
The ratio of VOT by mode is more consistent across samples by number of cars for the men 
(1.614, 1.742 and 1.754 instead of 1.543, 1.673 and 2.009), and this ratio is now consistently 
larger for women than for men in the 3 samples. However, this ratio still varies across 
samples for women (1.878, 2.206 and 1.922, respectively), although this variation is more 
moderate than in Table 4 (1.639, 2.116 and 1.741, respectively).  
Imposing that preferences do not change when a second car is bought by the household now 
reduces the log-likelihood by 11,434-10,644+18,020-17,135=1,675. This is less than half the 
difference estimated for the independent mode choice model of Section 4 (3,819), this means 
that preferences still significantly differ across samples, when the number of cars in the 
household increases.  
Additional parameters are estimated in this joint mode choice model. When spouses travel 
together by car, this induces an extra fixed premium for commuting together, as well as an 
additional VOT for commuting together. The fixed premium for commuting together adds to 
the average intercept for commuting alone by car for each spouse, weighted by the spouses’ 
respective Pareto weights (which are normalized to 0.5 for each spouse here). It corresponds 
to the difference between the average fixed utility of travelling by car together and the 
average of man’s and woman’s fixed utility of driving alone:  
        ' ', ' , . 1 . . 1 . 0.5
A A A A A Aj j j jj j C C C C C C
i i i i i iF i iM iF iMiF iM iF iM             
              
       
 (11) 
Similarly, the additional VOT for commuting together adds to the average VOT for 
commuting alone by car for each spouse, weighted by the spouses’ respective Pareto weights: 
        ' ', ' , . 1 . . 1 . 0.5
A A A A A Aj j j jj j C C C C C C
i i i i i iF i iM iF iMiF iM iF iM             
              
       
 (12) 
The value of these two parameters may depend on who is driving. 
  Pooled sample at least 2 cars 1 car 
Mode choice woman man Woman man woman Man 
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  Fixed utility of commuting by car alone
AC
iG
 
 Intercept (drive alone) -2.986 
*** 
-1.091 
*** 
-2.136 
*** 
-0.134 
 
-4.621 
*** 
-2.004 
*** 
 x (workplace in Inner Ring) 4.307 *** 3.247 *** 4.579 *** 3.269 *** 4.055 *** 2.983 *** 
 x (workplace in Outer Ring) 5.551 *** 4.381 *** 5.920 *** 4.652 *** 5.224 *** 3.907 *** 
 x (occup="blue collar") -0.065  0.701 *** -0.780 *** 0.371  0.265  0.773 *** 
 x (occup="employee") -  -  -  -  -  -   
 x (occup="professional") 0.918 *** 0.718 *** 0.938 *** 0.273  0.702 *** 0.700 *** 
 x (occup="white collar") 0.847 *** 0.394 *** 0.885 *** 0.318  0.449 ** -0.162  
 x (occup="self-employed") 3.941 *** 4.053 *** 3.579 *** 3.783 *** 3.529 *** 3.729 *** 
 x Foreign -1.559 *** -0.765 *** -2.124 *** -0.936 *** -1.148 *** -0.448 *** 
 x # children aged 0-3 0.191 *** n.s  0.303 ** n.s  0.226 *** n.s  
 x # children aged 4-6 0.244 *** n.s  0.466 *** n.s  0.163 * n.s  
 x # children aged 7-11 0.311 *** n.s  0.212 ** n.s  0.285 *** n.s  
 x # children aged 12-16 0.344 *** n.s  0.431 *** n.s  0.244 *** n.s  
 
Fixed premium for commuting together 
AA CC
i
jj
i
,',    
 when man drives -1.129
***
 
*** 
0.024
 
-0.367
***
 
*** 
 when woman drives 0.003
 
-0.108
 
0.442
***
 
*** 
 Value of time, by mode 
j
iG
 
 by transit 2.811 
*** 
2.720 
*** 
2.758 
*** 
2.894 
*** 
2.471 
*** 
2.277 
*** 
 by car, alone 5.280 
*** 
4.390 
*** 
6.085 
*** 
5.041 
*** 
4.749 
*** 
3.993 
*** 
 Ratio VOT Car/Bus 1.878 
 
1.614 
 
2.206 
 
1.742 
 
1.922 
 
1.754 
 
 
Additional VOT for commuting together 
AA CC
i
jj
i
,',    
 when man drives -1.988
*** 
-1.270
***
 
*** 
-1.850
***
 
*** 
 when woman drives 14.676
***
 
*** 
-0.861
**
 
** 
10.624
***
 
*** 
 x (age-40)/10 0.059  -0.276 *** -0.610 *** -0.758 *** -0.093  -0.295 *** 
 x (occup="blue collar") -1.139 *** -0.638 ** -0.857 * -1.381 *** -1.202 *** -0.271  
 x (occup="employee") -  -  -  -  -  -   
 x (occup="professional") 0.422 * -0.499 * 0.367  -0.353  0.508  -0.516 * 
 x (occup="white collar") 1.361 *** 1.150 *** 1.611 *** 0.702  1.151 ** 1.327 *** 
 x (occup="self-employed") -1.977 ** -1.856 *** -2.697 *** -2.017 *** -0.291  -1.395 *** 
 Woman's bargaining power 0.500
 
0.500
 
0.500
 
2
+
 c
ar
s 
 
# observations 18377 18377 - 
Log-likelihood -11434 -10644 - 
Pseudo-R² 36.1% 40.5% - 
1
 c
ar
 # observations 16538 - 16538 
Log- likelihood -18020 - -17135 
Pseudo-R² 25.3% - 28.9% 
Table 6: Estimation results for the joint multinomial logit with constant Pareto weights (unitary model) 
Significant at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level 
Our estimates show that the fixed premium for commuting together is not significantly 
different from zero when there are at least 2 cars in the household, whoever is driving, 
whereas, for households with 1 car only, it is significantly positive when the woman drives 
and negative when the man drives. It is also significantly negative in the pooled sample when 
the man drives. The average VOT of the couple is significantly reduced when they commute 
together rather than alone and the man drives. This suggests that the time spent to travel by 
car is less burdensome when spouses are together than when they are alone, at least when the 
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man drives. When the woman drives, the VOT is also reduced in the 2-car sample, but 
increased to extremely large values and unrealistic values in the 1-car sample and in the 
pooled sample. Such differences across samples can hardly be explained and will be discussed 
below. 
Altogether, it means that, in the 2-car sample, if travelling together would not induce a detour, 
spouses would prefer commuting together rather than commuting alone, especially if the man 
drives.  
The values of coefficients cannot be interpreted directly because parameters are identified 
only up to a multiplicative constant, which is different across samples (the variance of the 
residuals is normalized to ²/6 in each sample). In order to ease the interpretation of results of 
Table 6, we represent in Figure 3 and Figure 4 the probabilities that both spouses commute by 
car as a function of the common (identical for man and woman) commuting time, for 
individuals in the reference category both for the fixed part and for the marginal part of the 
utility, according to the estimates of Section 5.2. 
 
Figure 3: Probability to commute by car alone and together, as a function of commuting time in hours (same 
workplace for both spouses). Joint model with Pareto weight=0.5. Preferences dependent on the number of cars. 
Figure 3 uses the coefficients estimated separately in the subsample of households with 1 car 
and in the subsample of households with at least 2 cars, whereas Figure 4 uses the coefficients 
estimated in the pooled sample, imposing identical preferences for households with only 1 car 
or with at least 2 cars.  
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In this purely illustrative example, man and woman are assumed to work in the same place, so 
that there is no detour when spouses commute together, and the commuting time is assumed 
the same by car and by public transportation.  
For 1-car and 2-car households, two probabilities are represented: the probability to drive 
together when the woman drives and when the man drives. For household with 2 cars, an 
additional probability is represented: the probability that each spouse commutes alone by car. 
This probability decreases less and less rapidly as the commuting time increases, on both 
figures. 
 
Figure 4: Probability to commute by car alone and together, as a function of common commuting time in hours (same 
workplace for both spouses). Joint model with Pareto weight=0.5. Preferences independent on the number of cars. 
In the pooled sample (i.e. when preferences are assumed independent on the number of cars), 
the probability that the woman drops the man to his workplace exceeds 6% for very short 
distances, and it very rapidly tends to zero (as soon as the commuting time exceeds 15 
minutes). By contrast, the probability that the man drops the woman to her workplace slightly 
increases with commuting time.  
Results are fundamentally different when preferences are allowed to differ as a function of the 
number of cars. In this case, the probability that either spouse drops the other is almost always 
less than 2% with 1 car (2% to 4% for travel times less than 5 minutes if the woman drives), 
whereas it goes to 9% or 10% for very small commuting times in households with 2 cars.  
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Such differences in spouses’ preferences in households with 1 and 2 cars are hard to explain. 
They imply that either preferences change when a second car is bought, or an endogenous 
sample selection bias is induced by the fact that households decide car ownership. An 
alternative explanation could be related to the heterogeneity of Pareto weights across 
households. We will see in Section 5.3 that, although Pareto weights significantly differ 
across households, this is not enough to explain the surprising results obtained in Section 5.2. 
5.3. Estimation results with spouse-specific Pareto weights (or collective 
model)  
One potential reason for the unexplained differences found in Section 5.2 is the possibility 
that the Pareto weight varies across households, as a function of each spouse’s characteristics 
such as age, nationality, education or type of job contract, and of couple’s characteristics such 
as number of children or tenure status. The results of the corresponding model are reported in 
Table 7.  
To ensure that woman’s Pareto weight λi is comprised in [0, 1], it is assumed to be a logistic 
function of both spouses’ characteristics and household characteristics 
 
 
exp .
1 exp .
i
i
X
X





i ,where 
Xi denotes a vector of individual and couple-specific determinants of the Pareto weight. 
We consider no intercept in this function, which amounts to normalize to 0.5 the Pareto 
weight in the reference couple, i.e. to consider that the woman and the man in the reference 
couple have equal Pareto weights (50%). This reference couple is composed of French 
tenants, without children, with equal age and both with a permanent working contract. The 
results are reported in Table 7 and are qualitatively similar to that of Table 6 in Section 5.2.  
The fixed premium for commuting together is similar to the one found in Section 5.2, as well 
as the additional VOT for commuting together when the man drives. By contrast, the 
additional VOT for commuting together when the woman drives, becomes unexpectedly large 
in the pooled sample and in the sub-sample of 1-car households.  
According to our estimates, the woman’s Pareto weight tends to increase when she is older 
than her husband, but this effect is not significant. Foreign women have a larger Pareto weight 
when both spouses are Foreigners than when both spouses are French, although this 
difference is not significant in the 2-car sample.  
Compared to a situation in which neither spouse has a temporary job contract, the woman’s 
Pareto weight is significantly increased when only her husband has a temporary contract, and 
it is marginally decreased when she is the only one with a temporary contract, although this 
effect is significant only in the pooled sample. Finally, the woman’s Pareto weight is 
significantly increased in households which own their dwelling, and marginally (not 
significantly) decreased when the number of children increases. 
  Pooled sample at least 2 cars 1 car 
Mode choice woman man woman man woman man 
  
Fixed utility of commuting by car alone 
AC
iG  
  Intercept(drive alone) -2.825 
*** 
-1.144 
*** 
-2.041 
*** 
-0.154   -4.424 
*** 
-2.067 
*** 
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  x (workplace in Inner Ring) 4.156 *** 3.388 *** 4.498 *** 3.349 *** 3.922 *** 3.130 *** 
  x (workplace in Outer Ring) 5.332 *** 4.586 *** 5.785 *** 4.780 *** 5.033 *** 4.112 *** 
  x (occup="blue collar") -0.027   0.715 *** -0.753 *** 0.429   0.278   0.800 *** 
  x (occup="employee") -  -  -  -  -  -  
  x (occup="professional") 0.875 *** 0.743 *** 0.911 *** 0.301   0.697 *** 0.722 *** 
  x (occup="white collar") 0.804 *** 0.398 *** 0.867 *** 0.337   0.448 ** -0.185   
  x (occup="self-employed") 3.864 *** 4.205 *** 3.443 *** 3.874 *** 3.441 *** 3.854 *** 
  x foreign -1.562 *** -0.693 *** -2.121 *** -0.890 *** -1.047 *** -0.398 *** 
  x # children aged 0-3 0.194 *** n.s 
 
0.314 
** 
n.s 
 
0.206 
** 
n.s  
 
  x # children aged 4-6 0.252 *** n.s   0.459 *** n.s   0.142   n.s   
  x # children aged 7-11 0.318 *** n.s 
 
0.219 
** 
n.s 
 
0.271 
*** 
n.s  
 
  x # children aged 12-16 0.353 *** n.s   0.435 *** n.s   0.235 *** n.s   
  Fixed premium for commuting together 
AA CC
i
jj
i
,',    
  when man drives -1.143
*** 
-0.012
 
-0.382
*** 
  when woman drives -0.004
 
-0.153
 
0.438
*** 
  Value of time, by mode 
j
iG
 
  By transit 2.679 
*** 
2.811 
*** 
2.684 
*** 
3.031 
*** 
2.379 
*** 
2.354 
*** 
  By car, alone .091 
*** 
4.553 
*** 
5.987 
*** 
5.206 
*** 
4.580 
*** 
4.174 
*** 
  Ratio VOT Car/Bus 1.900 
  
1.620 
 
2.231 
 
1.717  
 
1.925 
 
1.773 
 
   Additional VOT for commuting together 
AA CC
i
jj
i
,',    
  when man drives -2.008
*** 
-1.185
*** 
-1.860
*** 
  when woman drives 15.019
*** 
-1.117
*** 
11.087
*** 
  x (age-40)/10 -0.028   -0.231 *** -0.634 *** -0.766 *** -0.121  -0.295 *** 
  x (occup="blue collar") -1.098 *** -0.614 ** -0.802 * -1.528 *** -1.136 *** -0.258   
  x (occup="employee") -  -  -  -  -  - 
 
  x (occup="professional") 0.379   -0.485 * 0.388   -0.439   0.420   -0.548 * 
  x (occup="white collar") 1.272 *** 1.267 *** 1.547 *** 0.677   1.053 ** 1.410 *** 
  x (occup="self-employed") -2.126 *** -1.907 *** -2.588 *** -2.253 *** -0.282   -1.431 *** 
 Woman’s Pareto weight 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  x (woman's age-man’s age)/10 0.039       0.077      0.024       
  x (both spouses are French) -    -    -     
  x (both spouses are foreign) 0.221 *** 
 
 
0.170 
 
 
 
0.261 
*** 
 
  
  x (foreign woman & French man) 0.129      -0.281 *    -0.024      
  x (French woman & foreign man) -0.007   
 
 
-0.129 
  
 
 
0.160 
  
 
  
  x (tenure status=homeownership) 0.178 *** 
 
 
0.102 
* 
 
 
0.157 
*** 
 
  
  x (neither spouse has temporary contract) -    -    -     
  x (both spouses have temporary contract) 0.047   
 
 
0.172 
  
 
 
0.138 
  
 
  
  x (only woman has temporary contract) -0.130 ***    -0.062      -0.093      
  x (only man has temporary contract) 0.358 *** 
 
 
0.429 
*** 
 
0.497 
*** 
 
  
  x # children -0.033 **    -0.026     -0.024     
2
+
 c
ar
s # observations 18377 18377 - 
log-likelihood -11412 -10632 - 
pseudo-R² 36.2% 40.6% - 
1
 c
ar
 # observations 16538 - 16538 
log- likelihood -17999 - -17116 
pseudo-R² 25.4% - 29.0% 
al
l 
# observations 34915 
 
  
log- likelihood -29411   
pseudo-R² 30.0%   
Table 7: Estimation results for the joint multinomial logit with couple-specific Pareto Weights 
Significant at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level 
5.4. Criticism and suggested solution 
Table 8 compares the predictive power of the models estimated in Sections 4, 5.2 and 5.3, by 
comparing the observed percentage of households in which both spouses commute by car to 
its prediction, separately in households with 1 and 2 cars. It confirms that mode choice is a 
joint decision at the household level, in the sense that the probability that both spouses 
 25 
 
commute by car is better explained by a joint mode choice model at the couple level than by a 
model assuming independent mode choice by spouses, as it is often assumed in the literature. 
The predictive power of the joint model is only marginally improved when Pareto weights are 
assumed heterogeneous across households, as discussed below.  
  Preferences independent on 
the number of cars 
Preferences dependent on the 
number of cars 
   (C
P
,C
D
) (C
D
,C
P
) Total (C
A
,C
A
) (C
P
,C
D
) (C
D
,C
P
) Total 
A
ll
 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
(3
4
9
1
5
 
co
u
p
le
s)
 
Observed 49.5% 49.5% 49.5% 49.5% 
Independent model 46.3% 46.3% 49.0% 49.0% 
Joint model : 
fixed PW 
23.3% 18.8% 3.4% 45.5% 17.5% 22.9% 8.9% 49.4% 
variable PW 23.0% 19.3% 3.3% 45.6% 17.3% 23.6% 8.5% 49.4% 
1
-c
a
r 
 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
(1
6
5
3
8
 
co
u
p
le
s)
 
Observed 21.8% 21.8% 21.8% 21.8% 
Independent model 36.3% 36.3% 22.5% 22.5% 
Joint model:  
 fixed PW 
0.0% 21.5% 3.9% 25.3% 0.0% 18.1% 3.7% 21.8% 
 variable PW 0.0% 21.5% 3.9% 25.3% 0.0% 18.2% 3.6% 21.8% 
2
-c
a
r 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
(1
8
3
7
7
 
co
u
p
le
s)
 
Observed 74.5% 74.5% 74.5% 74.5% 
Independent model 55.4% 55.4% 72.8% 72.8% 
Joint model:  
fixed PW 
44.3% 16.4% 2.9% 63.6% 33.3% 27.2% 13.6% 74.2% 
variable PW 44.3% 16.4% 2.9% 63.6% 33.0% 28.4% 12.9% 74.2% 
Table 8: Probability that both spouses commute by car, by model (* PW stands for Pareto weight) 
The predictive power of the independent models is particularly poor under the realistic 
hypothesis that preferences do not change after a second car is bought (left-hand side of the 
table). Although the predictions of each model on the pooled sample (merging households 
with 1 car and those with 2 or more cars) are close under the assumption that preferences do 
not depend on the number of cars (46.3% for the independent model against 45.6% for the 
joint model with variable Pareto weight, compared to the observed 49.5%), both models 
overestimate the probability to commute by car for 1-car households and underestimate that of 
2-car households. However, the joint model overestimates that of 1-car households by 3.5 
percentage points (25.3%-21.8%) against 15 points for the independent model (36.3%-
21.8%). Similarly, joint models underestimate the probability to commute by car in 2-car 
households by only 11 percentage points (74.5%-63.6%) against 19 for the independent 
model (74.5%-55.4%). 
The predictive power of the independent model is significantly improved when it is assumed 
that preferences depend on the number of cars. In this case, the probability that both spouses 
commute by car fit observed fraction nearly as well those of the joint model (right hand side 
of Table 8). However, this improvement relies on quite unrealistic difference across samples, 
as detailed below.  
When preferences are assumed to depend on the number of cars, in 1-car households, the 
fixed premium for commuting together is significantly negative when the man drives and 
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significantly positive when the woman drives whereas, in 2-car households, the fixed 
premium for commuting together is slightly negative but not significant whoever drives.  
Furthermore, the additional VOT when the woman drives the man to work appears 
unrealistically large when the joint model is estimated on the pooled sample, as well as in the 
1-car sample. By contrast, the additional VOT when the woman drives in 2-car households is 
significantly negative and the same as when the man drives.  
These surprising results suggest that the number of cars owned by households does not only 
influence their mode choice through the determination of their choice set. Car ownership is 
also endogenous in the sense that the number of cars is chosen by households together with 
mobility decision: car ownership and mode choice are interrelated decisions determined by 
common observed and unobservable variables. To take account of such endogeneity, the 
choice of the number of cars is explicitly accounted for in the model developed in the next 
section. 
6. Endogeneous car ownership and nested model 
6.1. Car ownership and mode choice 
We extend the previous multinomial joint mode choice model in order to model 
simultaneously couple’s choices of travel mode and car ownership. We obtain a three-level 
nested model in which the lower level corresponds to the mode choice, the intermediate level 
corresponds to the choice of a second car (conditional on choosing to own at least one) and 
the upper level corresponds to the choice to own at least one car. 
As shown by Figure 5, mode choice and car ownership are interrelated. When a household 
choose to own no car, its mode choice set is restricted to the alternative (B, B) (both spouses 
commute by public transport). When a household opts for car ownership, the choice of the 
number of cars determines the mode choice set as described in Section 5. 
According to the properties of the i.i.d. Gumbel distribution, the maximum utility that a 1-car 
household i can expect given the mode choice decision is then given by the inclusive value: 
          1 , , , , ,log exp exp exp exp exp
A A D P P DCar B B C B B C C C C C
i i i i i iI V V V V V
     
  
. (13) 
The maximum utility that a 2-car household i can expect given the mode choice decision is 
given by another inclusive value: 
           2 , , , , , ,log exp exp exp exp exp exp
A A D P P D A ACar B B C B B C C C C C C C
i i i i i i iI V V V V V V
      
  
. (14) 
The inclusive value represents the ex-ante expected maximum utility and satisfies Roy’s 
identity. In addition to the utility obtained from the mode choice, we assume that, 
conditionally on car ownership, owning n cars (n ≥ 1) provides a household with an intrinsic 
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deterministic utility denoted nCar
iV . Conditionally on car ownership, the utility associated 
with n-car ownership (n=1, 2) can then be written: 
 nCar nCar nCar nCari i iV I   , nCar=1, 2, (15) 
where nCar denotes the coefficient of the inclusive value and nCar
i  is a (0,1) Gumbel-
distributed error term. 
 
Figure 5: Nested structure of mode choice and car ownership 
By normalizing the intrinsic utility CariV
1 to zero, the probability to choose a second car can be 
written: 
 
 
   
2 2 2
2
1 1 2 2 2
exp
exp exp
Car Car Car
i iCar
i Car Car Car Car Car
i i i
V I
I V I

 


 
P . (16) 
Analogously, at the top level of the nested structure, the probability that the household choose 
to have at least one car is given by the following formula: 
 
 
   
exp
exp exp
Car Car Car
i iCar
i noCar noCar Car Car Car
i i i
V I
I V I

 


 
P , (17) 
Couple 
>0 car 
>1 car 
(B,B) 
(CA,B) 
(B,CA) 
(CD,CP) 
(CP,CD) 
(CA,CA) 
1 car 
(B,B) 
(CA,B) 
(B,CA) 
(CD,CP) 
(CP,CD) 
0 car 
(B,B) 
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where Car
iV designs the deterministic utility of owning at least one car (the deterministic 
utility of owning no car is normalized at zero) and the inclusive value Car
iI (
noCar
iI  ) 
corresponds to the maximum utility that household i can obtain from mode choice when 
owning at least one car (no car): 
   1 1 2 2 2log exp expCar Car Car Car Car Cari i i iI I V I      , 
 , ,log expnoCar B B B Bi i iI V V    . 
To sum up, the probability that household i chooses the mode (j,j’) and owns n cars (n=1,2) is 
the product: 
     , ,ni i ij j n P j j n  P P , 
where mode choice probabilities  njjPi , , n=1,2, are defined in Section 5 (see Equation 
(10)) and: 
 
 
1
2
1 ,
2 .
Car Car
i i i
Car Car
i i i
 
 
P P P
P P P
 
The probability that a household does not own a car and, consequently, that both spouses 
commute by public transport is given by:  
   0 1 2, 1noCar Car Cari i i iB B    P P P P . 
We postulate that the deterministic utilities Car
iV
2  and Car
iV are weighted averages of the 
man’s and woman’s utilities. The Pareto weights are assumed to be the same as in the 
collective utility function of modes (see Equation (3)): 
2 2 2. (1 ).Car Car Cari i F i MV       , 
. (1 ).Car Car Cari i F i MV       , 
where , ,CarG G F M  , represents the utility that the first car provides to the spouse G and 
2 , ,CarG G F M  represents the utility that the second car provides to the spouse G.  
Each spouse’s utility function is assumed to be linear in some individual characteristics and in 
some couple-specific characteristics (residence, number of children, tenure status). In this 
specification, the effect of the couple-specific characteristics respectively on the woman’s and 
the man’s deterministic utility can hardly be identified separately, like the fixed premium and 
additional VOT of travelling together in Section 5. Therefore, we rather estimate the weighted 
averages of both effects. Similarly, the fixed benefits of choosing the first and second cars can 
hardly be identified separately for the man and for the woman so that we estimate a weighted 
average fixed benefit for choosing the first car and a weighted average fixed benefit of 
choosing a second one. 
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6.2. Results 
To estimate this nested logit, we include households with no car in the pooled estimation 
sample and so the number of observed households increases to 36,997.The specification of the 
utilities of the different modes and of the bargaining power are assumed to be the same as in 
the previous model. Their parameters are estimated simultaneously with those of the car 
ownership model. 
Most of the previous results remain true with two notable exceptions which validate the need 
to include automobile ownership in the description together with mode choice. The fixed 
premium of commuting by car together is now significantly negative and larger in absolute 
value when the woman drives than when the man drives. Moreover, the additional VOT of 
commuting together by car is slightly more negative when the woman drives than when the 
man drives. This result is more plausible than the one obtained with the multinomial model on 
the pooled sample, which suggested a very large increase in VOT when commuting together 
rather than alone when the woman drives, and a decrease when the man drives. 
 Pooled sample (+households without car) 
Mode choice woman  man  
Fixed utility of commuting by car alone C
iG  
Intercept(drive alone) -2.814 
*** 
-1.064 
*** 
x (workplace in Inner Ring) 4.107 *** 3.371 *** 
x (workplace in Outer Ring) 5.268 *** 4.596 *** 
x (occup="blue collar") -0.135 
 
0.738 
*** 
x (occup=employee) -   -   
x (occup="professional") 0.778 *** 0.670 *** 
x (occup="white collar") 0.737 *** 0.128   
x (occup="self-employed") 3.713 *** 3.806 *** 
x Foreign -1.409 *** -0.661 *** 
x # children aged 0-3 0.204 *** n.s  
x # children aged 4-6 0.230 *** n.s  
x # children aged 7-11 0.346 *** n.s  
x # children aged 12-16 0.322 *** n.s  
Fixed premium for commuting together 
AA CC
i
jj
i
,',    
when man drives -1.184
*** 
when woman drives -1.588
*** 
Value of time, by mode 
j
iG
 
By transit 2.274 
*** 1.542 *** 
by car, alone 4.320 
*** 2.950 *** 
Ratio VOT Car/Bus 1.900  
 
1.913  
 
Additional VOT when traveling together 
AA CC
i
jj
i
,',  
 
when man drives -0.761
*** 
when woman drives -1.262
*** 
x (age-40)/10 -0.059   -0.311 *** 
x (occup="blue collar") -1.105 *** -0.318 
 x (occup=employee) -   -   
x (occup="professional") 1.092 *** 0.521 ** 
x (occup="white collar") 2.107 *** 3.082 *** 
x (occup="self-employed") -0.625   0.919 ** 
Choice of a second car    
  
  
  
Intercept (2 cars) -2.124
***
 
  
  
x (age-40)/10 0.537 *** 0.357 *** 
x Foreign -0.397 *** -0.403 *** 
x # children aged 0-16 0.071*** 
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x (residence in Inner Ring) 1.085*** 
 x (residence in Outer Ring) 1.180*** 
 Inclusive variable (1 car) 2.300
***
 
 Inclusive variable (2 cars) 2.156
***
 
***
 
 
Choice of a first car   
  
  
  
Intercept (1 car) 0.036 
  x (age-40)/10 0.685 *** 0.229 ** 
x Foreign -0.897 *** -1.665 *** 
x # children aged 0-16 0.198*** 
x (residence in Inner Ring) 1.287*** 
x (residence in Outer Ring) 1.723*** 
Inclusive variable (0 car) 0.240
*** 
Inclusive variable (1+ car) 0.830
*** 
Woman's bargaining power   
  
  
  
x (woman's age-man’s age)/10 -0.016       
x (both spouses are French) -       
x (both spouses are foreign) 0.133 * 
 
 x (foreign woman & French man) 0.144 *   
x (French woman & foreign man) -0.053 
 
 
 x (tenure status=homeownership) 0.126 *** 
 
 x (neither spouses have temporary contract ) -     
x (both spouses have temporary contract ) 0.260 ** 
 
 x (only woman has temporary contract) -0.062     
x (only man has temporary contract) 0.400 *** 
 
 x # children -0.037 ***   
# observations 36997 
Log-likelihood -56649 
Pseudo-R² 38.3% 
Table 9: Estimation results of car ownership and mode choice nested logit 
Significant at: *** 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level 
The probabilities to acquire a first and a second car are estimated simultaneously with the 
mode choice probabilities. For these car ownership choices, the reference spouses are 40-
year-old French individuals without children living in Paris. The benefit of owning a car 
increases with the spouses’ age (more significantly for women than for men) and with the 
number of children (in particular the benefit of the first car). Compared to the reference 
(residence inside Paris), the probability to own a car is larger when the couple lives in the 
Inner ring, and even larger when living in the Outer ring. This illustrates the higher difficulty 
of parking but also the greater supply of transport infrastructures in Paris.  
As shown on Figure 6, the probability that the man drives is larger for short commuting times 
(lower than 40 min), while the woman has more chance to be the driver for long travels (more 
than 40 min). Spouses are more likely to commute by car alone than together when 
commuting time is short (less than 1 hour 10 minutes if the woman drives, less than 1 hour 40 
minutes if the man drives).  
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Figure 6: Probability to commute by car alone and together, as a function of common commuting time (same 
workplace for both spouses). Nested model. 
7. Conclusions and extensions 
Values of time is typically estimated for men and women considered as independent decision 
makers, i.e. without taking care of the interaction in the couple and in particular ignoring the 
bargaining power in the couple. We have modelled here this bargaining power and 
highlighted empirically its determinants. When there is only one car that each active spouse 
wishes to use for commuting, the situation is more involved, and the family context matters.  
We have considered the study of mode choice in Paris region. For this study, we have 
demonstrated the inability of the standard independent choice model to reproduce the intra-
household mode-choice decision process within two-earner couples. To describe 
appropriately joint mode choice decisions, we have set-up a structural collective model. This 
model provides more plausible results and exhibits a greater predictive power. However, the 
parameters of this collective model must be estimated simultaneously with the parameters of a 
car ownership model, in order to avoid biases due to endogeneity of the number of cars jointly 
chosen by the household. To address the endogeneity issue, we model the combined choice of 
the number of cars and commuting. 
Economics of the family also matters in the long run (see Chiappori et al., 2014). In this case, 
the joint decision concerns residential location and work location choices. Such decisions are 
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2
P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 t
o
 c
o
m
m
u
te
 b
y 
e
ac
h
 m
o
d
e
 
Common commuting time (hours) 
Probability to commute by each mode,  
by number of cars  
(Car alone,Car alone), 2 cars (Car Driver,Car Passenger), 2 cars
(Car Passenger,Car Driver), 2 cars (Car Driver,Car Passenger), 1 car
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also interrelated with access to automobile. Modelling mode choice within couples might then 
enable to determine the long term effects on urban development when couples’ bargaining 
process is taken into account. 
The difference between the VOT of driving alone and the VOT of commuting together 
underlines that being accompanied rather than alone and being the passenger rather than the 
driver have strong effects on the VOT. These effects have different implications on 
carpooling, as far as who is driving and how the costs are shared. Our estimates show that 
there is a positive premium for the spouses to drive together. The average VOT of the 
reference couple is reduced by 20.9% when the man drives and by 34.7% when the woman 
drives. Using the 12.6 €/h official value in Paris area recommended by Quinet (2014), this 
represents a reduction of 2.64 €/h when the man drives, and 4.37 €/h when the woman drives. 
Carpooling is likely to affect the value of time, but likely in a qualitative different manner: 
being accompanied decreases the (average) value of time of spouses but may increase that of 
ridesharing people who do not know each other. Our methodology could potentially be 
adapted to compute these premia/penalties in the context of carpooling, which modal split has 
been rapidly growing during the last decade. 
How the interaction between being accompanied and being a passenger affect the VOT of 
commuting by car is also relevant when assessing the benefits of the automated vehicles since 
such vehicles constitute the only transport mode which enable an individual to commute by 
car as passenger while being alone (see International Transport Forum, 2015). The difference 
of VOT between the passenger and the driver depending on which spouse is the driver will be 
assessed in our future work. 
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